Firm-Specific Information, Product Differentiation, and Industry Equilibrium
Where consumers have imperfect i nformation about specific firms' prices and lack information about the market, f irms have informational market power. In general, improving the consumers' infor mation about each firm's price will not necessarily lower the average market pri ce. The authors show however that certain types ofimprovements will lower price. Moreover a reduction in barriers to entry (e.g., capital costs) will lower pri ce, holding information constant. Where a significant number (but not all), cons umers have perfect information, single-price equilibria are impossible. Copyright 1986 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 38 (1986)
Issue (Month): 0 (Suppl. Nov.)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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