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The impact of attitude strength on the use of customer satisfaction information: an empirical investigation

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  • van Birgelen, M.J.H.

    (Marketing & Supply Chain Management)

  • de Ruyter, J.C.

    (Marketing & Supply Chain Management)

  • Wetzels, M.G.M.

    (Marketing & Supply Chain Management)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • van Birgelen, M.J.H. & de Ruyter, J.C. & Wetzels, M.G.M., 2000. "The impact of attitude strength on the use of customer satisfaction information: an empirical investigation," Research Memorandum 037, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2000037
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2000037
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    2. Chateauneuf, Alain & Cohen, Michele, 1994. "Risk Seeking with Diminishing Marginal Utility in a Non-expected Utility Model," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 77-91, July.
    3. Hong, Chew Soo & Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 1987. "Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 370-381, August.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Kannai, Yakar, 1977. "Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-56, March.
    6. Crawford, Vincent P. & Varian, Hal R., 1979. "Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 203-206.
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