The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem?
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- Kriechel, Ben & Ziesemer, Thomas, 2005. "The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem?," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordseconomics of technology ;
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
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