Environmental Regulations and Managerial Myopia
It has recently been claimed that, contrary totraditional neoclassical theory, suitably chosenenvironmental regulation is often beneficial for theregulated firms because it induces cost-reducinginnovations. I analyze the extent to which thisposition is compatible with microeconomic analysis. Itturns out that even in a framework in whichorganizational inefficiencies might lead tounderinvestment, environmental policy can onlyincrease firm profits if several very specificconditions are met. These conditions concern the typeof policy, the extent of inefficiencies, the costs ofpotential innovation projects and their effect onproductivity and abatement costs. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Masahiko Aoki, 2013.
"Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,"
in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 18, pages 315-341
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133 Elsevier.
- DeCanio, Stephen J., 1993. "Barriers within firms to energy-efficient investments," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(9), pages 906-914, September.
- Stein, Jeremy C, 1988.
"Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 61-80, February.
- Gabel H. Landis & Sinclair-Desgagne Bernard, 1993. "Managerial Incentives and Environmental Compliance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 229-240, May.
- Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard & Gabel, H. Landis, 1997.
"Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 331-346, July.
- H. Landis Gabel & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 1996. "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-21, CIRANO.
- Richard J. Zeckhauser & John Pound, 1990. "Are Large Shareholders Effective Monitors? An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate Performance," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 149-180 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Karen Palmer & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 1995. "Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 119-132, Fall.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:18:y:2001:i:1:p:87-100. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.