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More about this item
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-02-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-PKE-2007-02-10 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-02-10 (Positive Political Economics)
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