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A Economia das Firmas Cooperadas e a Análise Antitruste
[The Economics of Cooperative Firms and the Antitrust Analysis]

Author

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  • Esteves, Luiz A.

Abstract

The economic literature has spent decades of analytical effort in order to provide theoretical and empirical evidence on behavior differences between firms managed by capital (conventional capitalist firms) and firms managed by labor (including cooperatives and professional associations), mainly in respect to their goals. Conventional capitalist firms aim to maximize profits, while the cooperative firms aim employment and output stability. The antitrust policy have replicated the same treatment used to analyze conventional capitalist firms in order to analyze cooperative firms. Such behavior can increase the probability of type I and type II errors. In terms of public policy, the conclusion of this article is that a concentration or coordination between cooperative or professional associations is not, per se, a necessary and sufficient condition to cause competitive harm. The idiosyncrasies of these types of organizations require specific analysis and application of the rule of reason.

Suggested Citation

  • Esteves, Luiz A., 2014. "A Economia das Firmas Cooperadas e a Análise Antitruste [The Economics of Cooperative Firms and the Antitrust Analysis]," MPRA Paper 58908, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:58908
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Cooperatives; Monopolies; Cartels;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises

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