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"Small, yet beautiful": Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

Author

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  • Subhasish Modak Chowdhury

    (University of East Anglia)

  • Sang-Hyun Kim

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser-elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests, and the case in which there is restriction in the number of sub-contests.

Suggested Citation

  • Subhasish Modak Chowdhury & Sang-Hyun Kim, 2015. ""Small, yet beautiful": Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2015-05, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2015_05
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
    2. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "Contest architecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 70-96, January.
    3. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kim, Sang-Hyun, 2014. "A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 357-359.
    4. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
    5. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2009. "The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 146-161, May.
    6. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1996. "A Multi-winner Nested Rent-Seeking Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 177-184, April.
    7. Berry, S Keith, 1993. "Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 437-443, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Czerny, Achim I. & Fosgerau, Mogens & Jost, Peter-J. & van Ommeren, Jos N., 2019. "Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 419-433.
    2. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2019. "A general framework for studying contests," MPRA Paper 97363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Lu, Jingfeng & Shen, Bo & Wang, Zhewei, 2017. "Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 25-35.
    4. Leppälä, Samuli, 2018. "Partial Exclusivity Can Resolve The Empirical Puzzles Associated With Rent-Seeking Activities," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2018/25, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    5. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contest design; multiple winner; group-size; selection mechanism;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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