A Note on Multi-winner Contest Mechanisms
We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the nested elimination mechanism becomes equivalent to another popular mechanism suggested by Berry (1993) where the winners are chosen simultaneously.
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- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014.
"A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments,"
59714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-109, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2012. "A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments," Working Papers 12-22, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Dana Sisak, 2009. "Multiple-Prize Contests - The Optimal Allocation Of Prizes," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 82-114, 02.
- Berry, S Keith, 1993. " Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 437-43, October.
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