Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners
This paper examines the impact of the number of winners allowed by regulators on rent-seeking expenditures. It is demonstrated in a widely used model that an increase in the number of winners will decrease total rent-seeking expenditures. This result is generally obtained regardless of whether the firms are risk-averse or risk-lovers. When regulators award coveted market franchises, there will be smaller welfare losses if more winners are allowed. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:77:y:1993:i:2:p:437-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.