Dinámica evolutiva en un modelo de interacción entre visitantes y residentes de una localidad turística
In this paper we model tourism development in the framework of multi- population dynamics and analyze the time pattern of its impact as the evolution of the interaction between two populations feeding over the same space-resource. Each population might be structured in two (or more) ?clubs? with variable membership, a club being a group of population members sharing social and economic interests as to the management of the relevant resource. Thus, each club has in principle a di¤erent set of strategies as to protection and valorization of broadly de?ned environmental resources at the tourist destination. Such resources share some of the characteristics of the so called commons. To represent such peculiar situation, we use Evolutionary Game Theory, in particular as is applied to the theory of evolution of interacting structured populations. In one such game, one strategy will be characterized as conservative and its alternative as depredative. Interaction between di¤erent strategies and the corresponding playing clubs gives rise to a rich dynamics, as some joint outcomes are inherently unstable, as is known, others being evolutionary stable. Such situation will be modelled by a version of the well known replicator dynamics, to emphasize its evolutionary nature.
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