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Small is Successful!?

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Abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence on exit behavior of asymmetrically sized firms in a duopoly with declining demand. We conduct three treatments: (a) The basic model with indivisible real capital. The structure of this treatment represents the main findings of Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985); (b) an extension of the basic model by introducing a bankruptcy constraint; (c) here we allow for divisible real capital (Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990)). In all three treatments we find behavior that is, by and large, in line with subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. However, there is a problem of multiplicity of equilibria in (b) and we find an anchor effect as well as learning effects in (c).

Suggested Citation

  • Mathias Erlei & Jens-Peter Springmann, 2006. "Small is Successful!?," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0005, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
    • Handle: RePEc:tuc:tucewp:0005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martha A. Schary, 1991. "The Probability of Exit," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 339-353, Autumn.
    2. Troske, Kenneth R, 1996. "The Dynamic Adjustment Process of Firm Entry and Exit in Manufacturing and Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 705-735, October.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-960, July.
    5. Dierickx, I. & Matutes, C. & Neven, D., 1991. "Cost differences and survival in declining industries : A case for 'picking winners'?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 1507-1528, December.
    6. Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2003. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoly with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1379, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Pankaj Ghemawat & Barry Nalebuff, 1990. "The Devolution of Declining Industries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 167-186.
    8. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1997. "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1889, David K. Levine.
    9. John Londregan, 1990. "Entry and Exit over the Industry Life Cycle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 446-458, Autumn.
    10. Michael D. Whinston, 1988. "Exit with Multiplant Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 568-588, Winter.
    11. Anderson, Philip & Tushman, Michael L, 2001. "Organizational Environments and Industry Exit: The Effects of Uncertainty, Munificence and Complexity," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 10(3), pages 675-711, September.
    12. Baden-Fuller, Charles W F, 1989. "Exit from Declining Industries and the Case of Steel Castings," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 949-961, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exit; duopoly; declining market; experimental economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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