Small is Successful!?
This paper provides experimental evidence on exit behavior of asymmetrically sized firms in a duopoly with declining demand. We conduct three treatments: (a) The basic model with indivisible real capital. The structure of this treatment represents the main findings of Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985); (b) an extension of the basic model by introducing a bankruptcy constraint; (c) here we allow for divisible real capital (Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990)). In all three treatments we find behavior that is, by and large, in line with subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. However, there is a problem of multiplicity of equilibria in (b) and we find an anchor effect as well as learning effects in (c).
|Date of creation:||2006|
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- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1997. "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1889, David K. Levine.
- Darren Filson & Bunchon Songsamphant, 2005. "Horizontal mergers and exit in declining industries," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 129-132.
- Darren Filson & Bunchon Songsamphant, "undated". "Horizontal Mergers and Exit in Declining Industries," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2001-13, Claremont Colleges.
- Troske, Kenneth R, 1996. "The Dynamic Adjustment Process of Firm Entry and Exit in Manufacturing and Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 705-735, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-960, July.
- Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2003. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoly with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1379, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pankaj Ghemawat & Barry Nalebuff, 1990. "The Devolution of Declining Industries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 167-186.
- Baden-Fuller, Charles W F, 1989. "Exit from Declining Industries and the Case of Steel Castings," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 949-961, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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