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Antidumping and Production-Line Exit: The Case of the US Steel Industry

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Listed:
  • Bruce Blonigen

    ()

  • Benjamin Liebman

    ()

  • Wesley Wilson

    ()

Abstract

We present and examine a novel data set that contains production line information inside US steel plants. We exploit this highly disaggregated data to perform the first study of entry and exit behavior at the level of the production line within individual plants. Our empirical analysis reveals a number of interesting results. First, smaller production lines are more likely to shut down, as are lines that are owned by larger firms. Younger production lines and lines that have undergone modernization are more likely to survive. Our results indicate that lines that are operated by integrated producers are more likely to exit. We find no evidence, however, that antidumping decreases the likelihood of exit, despite the steel industry’s frequent use of antidumping protection. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Blonigen & Benjamin Liebman & Wesley Wilson, 2013. "Antidumping and Production-Line Exit: The Case of the US Steel Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(4), pages 395-413, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:42:y:2013:i:4:p:395-413
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-013-9387-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antidumping; Trade protection; Exit; L11; L12; L13; F12;

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation

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