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Exit Strategies and Plant-Closing Decisions: The Case of Steel


  • Mary E. Deily


Several articles show that differences in firm characteristics such as size or diversification may affect plant-closing decisions during an industry's decline such that higher-cost plants survive lower-cost plants. Examination of the plant-closing decisions of integrated steel firms indicates that individual plant characteristics that determine expected revenues and costs explain much of the firms' plant-closing behavior but that firm size may have had some effect at well.

Suggested Citation

  • Mary E. Deily, 1991. "Exit Strategies and Plant-Closing Decisions: The Case of Steel," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 250-263, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:22:y:1991:i:summer:p:250-263

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Emin Dinlersoz & Glenn MacDonald, 2009. "The Industry Life-Cycle of the Size Distribution of Firms," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(4), pages 648-667, October.
    2. Antoine Faure- Grimaud & Roman Inderst, 2005. "Conglomerate Entrenchment under Optimal Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 850-861, June.
    3. Bergman, Mats A. & Johansson, Per & Bergman, M.A., 2002. "Large investments in the pulp and paper industry: a count data regression analysis," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 29-52.
    4. Bichescu, Bogdan & Raturi, Amitabh, 2015. "The antecedents and consequences of plant closing announcements," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 197-210.
    5. Bergman, Mats & Johansson, Per, 2000. "Strategic Investments in the Pulp and Paper Industry: A Count Data Regression Analysis," Umeå Economic Studies 536, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    6. Fleischmann, Matthew P & Prentice, David, 2001. "Strategy, Scale or Policy? Exit in the Australian Car Industry," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 77(239), pages 351-360, December.
    7. Takahashi, Yuya, 2013. "Estimating a War of Attrition: The Case of the U.S. Movie Theater Industry," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 424, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    8. Mata, Jose & Portugal, Pedro & Guimaraes, Paulo, 1995. "The survival of new plants: Start-up conditions and post-entry evolution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 459-481, December.
    9. Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen, 2002. "The Deaths of Manufacturing Plants," NBER Working Papers 9026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Kräkel, Matthias, 2010. "Shutdown Contests in Multi-Plant Firms and Governmental Intervention," IZA Discussion Papers 4852, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    11. Prantl, Susanne, 2003. "Bankruptcy and Voluntary Liquidation: Evidence for New Firms in East and West Germany after Unification," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-72, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    12. Sherrill Shaffer, 2002. "Conduct in a Banking Monopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 20(3), pages 221-238, May.
    13. Louri, Helen & Peppas, Costas & Tsionas, Efthymios, 2006. "Foreign presence, technical efficiency and firm survival in Greece: a simultaneous equation model with latent variables approach," MPRA Paper 29274, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Andrew B Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen, 2007. "Firm Structure, Multinationals, and Manufacturing Plant Deaths," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(2), pages 193-204, May.
    15. Chen, Ming-Yuan, 2002. "Survival duration of plants: Evidence from the US petroleum refining industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 517-555, April.
    16. John Sutton, 1996. "Gibrats Legacy," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 14, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    17. Darren Filson & Bunchon Songsamphant, 2005. "Horizontal mergers and exit in declining industries," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 129-132.
    18. Bruce Blonigen & Benjamin Liebman & Wesley Wilson, 2013. "Antidumping and Production-Line Exit: The Case of the US Steel Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(4), pages 395-413, June.
    19. Ron Jarmin, 1999. "Government Technical Assistance Programs* And Plant Survival: The Role Of Plant Ownership Type," Working Papers 99-2, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    20. Rehnen, Lena Marie, 2016. "Exit strategies of loyalty programs," jbm - Journal of Business Market Management, Free University Berlin, Marketing Department, vol. 9(1), pages 564-596.
    21. Susanne Prantl, 2000. "Post-Entry Selection Among Newly Founded Firms in East and West Germany after Unification: A Competing Risk Model with Forced Bankruptcy Liquidations and Voluntary Liquidations," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1602, Econometric Society.
    22. Tetsuji Okazaki & Ken Onishi & Naoki Wakamori, 2017. "Excess Capacity and Effectiveness of Policy Interventions: Evidence from the Cement Industry," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1073, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    23. Darlene C. Chisholm & George Norman, 2006. "When to Exit a Product: Evidence from the U. S. Motion-Picture Exhibition Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 57-61, May.

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