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Assessment of Post-merger Coordinated Effects: Characterization by Simulations

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  • Ivaldi, Marc
  • Lagos, Vicente

Abstract

This paper aims to evaluate the coordinated effects of horizontal mergers by simulating its impact on firms’ critical discount factors. The simulation setting considers a model with a random coefficient discrete choice demand and heterogeneous price-setting firms on the supply side. The results suggest that mergers strengthen the incentives to collude among merging parties, but weaken the incentives of non-merging parties. In addition, while the magnitude of this impact is moderate for the latter, it can be substantial for merging parties. Finally, general policy lessons regarding the assessment of the magnitude of these effects can be drawn from the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivaldi, Marc & Lagos, Vicente, 2016. "Assessment of Post-merger Coordinated Effects: Characterization by Simulations," TSE Working Papers 16-631, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:30295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oliver Budzinski & Gisela Aigner & Arndt Christiansen, 2006. "The Analysis of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where do we stand after Sony/BMG and Impala?," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200614, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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    7. Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2018. "Quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 108-149.
    8. Farrell Joseph & Shapiro Carl, 2010. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-41, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017. "Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 654-682, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Assessment - Collusion - Coordinated effects - Critical Discount Factor - Merger Simulation;

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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