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Star-Shaped Probability Weighting Functions and Overbidding in First-Price Auctions

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  • Armantier, Olivier
  • Treich, Nicolas

Abstract

There is a debate about whether risk aversion is the main source of overbidding in a first-price independent private values auction. As an alternative, we adopt a non-expected utility framework, and identify an interpretable property on the probability weighting function which always induces overbidding.

Suggested Citation

  • Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2009. "Star-Shaped Probability Weighting Functions and Overbidding in First-Price Auctions," TSE Working Papers 09-024, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:22143
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Keskin, Kerim, 2018. "Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 85-91.
    2. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    3. Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Rasch, Alexander & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2016. "Preferences and Decision Support in Competitive Bidding," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145849, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Zeynep Kantur & Kerim Keskin, 2019. "On (mis-)perception of probabilities in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(1), pages 726-733.
    5. Dahm, Matthias & González, Paula & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2018. "The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 21-32.
    6. Filiz-Ozbay, Emel & Ozbay, Erkut Y., 2010. "Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 217-219, May.
    7. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2017. "A Naïve Approach to Bidding," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2017-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    8. Sascha Füllbrunn & Dirk‐Jan Janssen & Utz Weitzel, 2019. "Risk Aversion And Overbidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions: New Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 631-647, January.
    9. Ziyi Tan & Shulin Liu, 2022. "The Generalized First- and Second-Price Auctions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Price," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-15, January.
    10. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018. "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2018-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    11. repec:wyi:journl:002158 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    probability weighting function; auctions; overbidding; non-expected utility; risk aversion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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