Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs
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References listed on IDEAS
- Kathryn E. Spier, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108.
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- Grechenig, Kristoffel & Sekyra, Michael, 2011. "No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 16-20, March.
More about this item
Keywordslitigation; settlement; bargaining; contracting with externalities; derivative suits; public goods;
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-02-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2008-02-23 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2008-02-23 (Public Economics)
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