No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe - A Model of Percentage Limits, Collusion and Residual Owners
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- Sergey Stepanov, 2010.
"Shareholder access to manager-biased courts and the monitoring/litigation trade-off,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 270-300.
- Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "Shareholder Access to Manager-Biased Courts and the Monitoring/Litigation Tradeoff," Working Papers w0106, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
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KeywordsAgency Theorey; Derivative Suits; Shareholder Suits; Percentage Limits; Collusion; Residual Owners; Corporate Fraud; Managerial Misconduct; European Law; European Corporations; Europe; Large Shareholders; Free Rider; Collective Action; Settlements; Monitoring; Rent-Seeking;
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2007-06-11 (European Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-06-11 (Law & Economics)
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