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Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk : A General Equilibrium Exposition

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  • Di Nicolo, G.
  • Lucchetta, M.

Abstract

We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Di Nicolo, G. & Lucchetta, M., 2010. "Financial Intermediation, Competition, and Risk : A General Equilibrium Exposition," Discussion Paper 2010-67S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:2c5af9d5-3533-452b-83cb-cb51302629f4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gerti Shijaku, 2017. "How Does Competition Affect Bank Stability After the Global Crises in the Case of the Albanian Banking System?," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 15(2), pages 175-208.
    2. Samantas, Ioannis, 2013. "Bank competition and financial (in)stability in Europe: A sensitivity analysis," MPRA Paper 51621, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Shijaku, Gerti, 2017. "Bank Stability and Competition: Evidence from Albanian Banking Market," MPRA Paper 79891, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Marcella Lucchetta & Gianni De Nicolo, 2011. "Bank Competition and Financial Stability; A General Equilibrium Exposition," IMF Working Papers 11/295, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Marcella Lucchetta & Michele Moretto & Bruno M. Parigi, 2019. "Optimal bailouts, bank’s incentive and risk," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 369-399, September.
    6. IJtsma, Pieter & Spierdijk, Laura & Shaffer, Sherrill, 2017. "The concentration–stability controversy in banking: New evidence from the EU-25," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 273-284.
    7. Fischer, Andreas M & Yesin, Pinar, 2019. "Foreign currency loan conversions and currency mismatches," CEPR Discussion Papers 13923, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Teresa Lloyd-Braga & Leonor Modesto, 2016. "Could competition always raise the risk of bank failure?," Working Papers of BETA 2016-27, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    9. Samantas, Ioannis G., 2017. "On the optimality of bank competition policy," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 39-53.
    10. Fiordelisi, Franco & Mare, Davide Salvatore, 2014. "Competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-16.
    11. Shijaku, Gerti, 2016. "Does bank competition affect bank stability after the global financial crisis?," MPRA Paper 79084, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Douglas Gale, 2010. "The Effects of Bank Capital on Lending: What Do We Know, and What Does It Mean?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(34), pages 187-204, December.
    13. ap Gwilym, Rhys & Kanas, Angelos & Molyneux, Philip, 2013. "U.S. prompt corrective action and bank risk," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 239-257.
    14. Elena Loukoianova & Gianni De Nicolo & John H. Boyd, 2009. "Banking Crises and Crisis Dating; Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 09/141, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Douglas Gale, 2015. "Regulation and Sausages," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83, pages 1-26, December.
    16. Mansur, Alfan, 2018. "Measuring Systemic Risk on Indonesia’s Banking System," MPRA Paper 93300, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Apr 2018.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    General Equilibrium; Bank Competition; Market Power Rents; Risk;

    JEL classification:

    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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