Aspects of Bureaucratic Corruption
This review attempts to identify treatments of corruption that draw upon characteristics of underdevelopment either as causes or as consequences. It focuses on three aspects of corruption in developing economies: red tape, rent-seeking, and the abundance of intermediaries. Red tape is presented as arising from differences in ability-to-pay and willingness-to-pay, which is a consequence of incomplete or absent markets in LDCs. Rent-seeking is viewed as a reason for inefficient allocation of resources. We emphasise that there is very little analysis of intermediation, but analysis is necessary to understand the structure of corruption markets.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: +61)-2- 9313- 6337
Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2009.
"Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 45-57, April.
- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2008. "Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary," Working Papers 08-11, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2010-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriele Gratton)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.