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Concurrence sur le marche des produits et couts de delegation


  • Baggs, Jennifer
  • de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne


Nous modelisons les effets de la concurrence du marche des produits sur les couts de delegation et y allons de deux grandes previsions d'ordre empirique. D'abord, la concurrence, en diminuant les couts de delegation, accroit nettement l'importance qu'attachent les entreprises a l'amelioration de la qualite, d'ou une plus forte incitation au rendement et, de ce fait, un accroissement de l'effort et de la qualite. Ensuite, ces effets s'accentuent en situation de gravite des problemes de delegation et devraient etre plus marques dans les grandes societes hierarchisees (ou ces problemes se posent avec plus de gravite) que dans les entreprises individuelles. Nous verifions les previsions de notre modele a l'aide d'un ensemble unique de donnees decrivant les caracteristiques tant des entreprises que de leurs salaries.

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  • Baggs, Jennifer & de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne, 2006. "Concurrence sur le marche des produits et couts de delegation," Direction des etudes analytiques : documents de recherche 2006287f, Statistics Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:stc:stcp3f:2006287f

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Employment and unemployment; Hours of work and work arrangements; Labour; Wages; salaries and other earnings;

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