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Concurrence sur le marche des produits et couts de delegation

  • Baggs, Jennifer
  • de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne

Nous modelisons les effets de la concurrence du marche des produits sur les couts de delegation et y allons de deux grandes previsions d'ordre empirique. D'abord, la concurrence, en diminuant les couts de delegation, accroit nettement l'importance qu'attachent les entreprises a l'amelioration de la qualite, d'ou une plus forte incitation au rendement et, de ce fait, un accroissement de l'effort et de la qualite. Ensuite, ces effets s'accentuent en situation de gravite des problemes de delegation et devraient etre plus marques dans les grandes societes hierarchisees (ou ces problemes se posent avec plus de gravite) que dans les entreprises individuelles. Nous verifions les previsions de notre modele a l'aide d'un ensemble unique de donnees decrivant les caracteristiques tant des entreprises que de leurs salaries.

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Paper provided by Statistics Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques in its series Direction des etudes analytiques : documents de recherche with number 2006287f.

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Date of creation: 04 Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:stc:stcp3f:2006287f
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  1. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September.
  2. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 19772, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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  9. Chad Syverson, 2001. "Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example," Working Papers 01-06, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
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