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Product Differentiation and Relative Performance Evaluation in an Asymmetric Duopoly


  • Aditi Sengupta

    () (Southern Methodist University)


In a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly with asymmetric costs, I show that an increase in the intensity of market competition (product differentiation) increases the absolute weight placed on rival's profit (relative performance) in the managerial compensation scheme for both firms and also increases market concentration. The relatively efficient (larger) firm always places higher weight on rival's performance and obtains higher market share.

Suggested Citation

  • Aditi Sengupta, 2007. "Product Differentiation and Relative Performance Evaluation in an Asymmetric Duopoly," Departmental Working Papers 0708, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:smu:ecowpa:708

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    2. Nolan Miller & Amit Pazgal, 2002. "Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 51-68.
    3. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1999-2043, December.
    4. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
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    More about this item


    Strategic Delegation; Relative Performance; Managerial Compensation; Oligopoly;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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