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Priority-augmented House Allocation

Author

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  • Xiang Han

    () (Southern Methodist University)

Abstract

We consider the standard indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer and allow each object to have a weak priority over agents. It is well known that generally in such a problem stability (or no justified-envy) is not compatible with efficiency. We characterize the priority structures for which a stable and efficient assignment always exists, as well as the priority structures which admit a stable, efficient and (group) strategy-proof rule. While house allocation and housing market are two classical allocation problems that admit a stable, efficient and group strategy-proof rule, any priority-augmented allocation problem with more than three objects admits such a rule if and only if it is decomposable into a sequence of subproblems, each of which has the house allocation or the housing market structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiang Han, 2014. "Priority-augmented House Allocation," Departmental Working Papers 1408, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:smu:ecowpa:1408
    as

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    File URL: ftp://ftp1.economics.smu.edu/WorkingPapers/2014/HAN/HAN-2014-08.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    2. Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
    3. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 669-689.
    4. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
    5. Ehlers, Lars & Erdil, Aytek, 2010. "Efficient assignment respecting priorities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1269-1282, May.
    6. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 368-371.
    7. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
    8. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Deb, Rajat & Ehlers, Lars, 2005. "Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 161-186, August.
    9. Kesten, Onur, 2006. "On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 155-171, March.
    10. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Indivisible object; priority; house allocation; housing market; stability; group strategy-proofness;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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