Mobility-based gerrymandering: Theory and evidence

This paper models theoretically and tests empirically the hypothesis that the decision about the location of a public bad within a multi-tiered structure of government (a facility providing benefits throughout the federation but inflicting damage to the region hosting it) can be driven by strategic electoral considerations exploiting the heterogeneous migration responses to the location of the public bad by voters of different ideologies - a sort of mobility-based gerrymandering. As long as the average utility loss from living close to the public bad is larger for progressives than it is for conservatives, conservative and progressive central governments will pursue opposite strategies. The former locate the public bad in an electorally tight region to induce progressive voters to exit and gain the region for the conservative party, while the latter attempt to spread progressive voters out of safe and into electorally tight regions. An application to waste treatment plant locations across Italian municipalities returns evidence in support of the model’s main hypotheses.