A Behavioral Defense of Rational Expectations
This paper studies decision making by agents who value optimism, but are unsure of their environment. As in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), an agent’s optimism is assumed to be tempered by the decision costs it imposes. As in Hansen and Sargent (2008), an agent’s uncertainty about his environment leads him to formulate ‘robust’ decision rules. It is shown that when combined, these two considerations can lead agents to adhere to the Rational Expectations Hypothesis. Rather than being the outcome of the sophisticated statistical calculations of an impassive expected utility maximizer, Rational Expectations can instead be viewed as a useful approximation in environments where agents struggle to strike a balance between doubt and hope.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada|
Web page: http://www.sfu.ca/economics.html
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- Tomasz Strzalecki, 2011.
"Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences,"
Econometric Society, vol. 79(1), pages 47-73, January.
- Tomasz Strzalecki, "undated". "Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences," Working Paper 8239, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Tomasz Strzalecki, 2011. "Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000126, David K. Levine.
- Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2011. "Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences," Scholarly Articles 14397610, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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