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Self-Preferencing in Markets with Vertically-Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms

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Abstract

The competitive strategies of 'gatekeeper' platforms are subject to enhanced scrutiny. For instance, Apple and Google are being accused of charging excessive access fees to app providers and privileging their own apps. Some have argued that such allegations make no economic sense when the platform's business model is to sell devices. In this paper, we build a model in which a gatekeeper device-seller facing potentially saturated demand for its device has the incentive and the ability to exclude from the market third-party suppliers of a service that consumers buy via its devices. Foreclosure is more likely if demand growth for the platform's devices is slow or negative, and can harm consumers if the device-seller's services are inferior to those offered by the third parties.

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  • Jorge Padilla & Joe Perkins & Salvatore Piccolo, 2020. "Self-Preferencing in Markets with Vertically-Integrated Gatekeeper Platforms," CSEF Working Papers 582, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:582
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    Cited by:

    1. Bonatti, Alessandro & Bergemann, Dirk, 2022. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 17544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Budzinski, Oliver, 2021. "Europäische Regulierung digitaler Dienste: Eine kritische Würdigung der Entwürfe DMA & DSA aus medienökonomischer Perspektive," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 158, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    3. Afilipoaie, Adelaida & Donders, Karen & Ballon, Pieter, 2022. "The European Commission's approach to mergers involving software-based platforms: Towards a better understanding of platform power," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(5).
    4. Steffen, Nico & Wiewiorra, Lukas & Kroon, Peter, 2021. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung in der Plattform- und Datenökonomie," WIK Discussion Papers 481, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    5. Federico Etro, 2021. "Product selection in online marketplaces," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 614-637, August.
    6. Etro, Federico, 2021. "Device-funded vs ad-funded platforms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    7. Eric K. Clemons & Ravi V. Waran & Sebastian Hermes & Maximilian Schreieck & Helmut Krcmar, 2022. "Computing and Social Welfare," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 32(2), pages 417-436, June.
    8. Budzinski, Oliver, 2021. "Wettbewerbsordnung und digitale Medienmärkte," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 153, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    9. Budzinski, Oliver & Gänßle, Sophia & Lindstädt-Dreusicke, Nadine, 2021. "Data (r)evolution - The economics of algorithmic search and recommender services," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 148, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Durable Goods; Foreclosure; Gatekeeper Platforms; Self-Preferencing; Vertical Integration.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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