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Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability

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We present a model of a media market in which a set of news outlets compete to break news. In our model, each media receives some information on whether a politician in office is corrupt. Media outlets can decide whether to break the story immediately or wait and fact-check, taking into account that if another media breaks the news, the profit opportunity disappears. We show that as the number of competitors increases, each outlet becomes more likely to break the news without fact-checking. Therefore, as the number of media increases, the incumbent politician is more likely to be accused of corruption by the media: this makes the re-election of incumbents more difficult and increases political turnover. In particular, we show that if voters consult with higher priority the media outlets that report about a scandal, increasing the number of competitors decreases the probability of having an honest politician in office.

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  • Giovanni Andreottola & Antoni-Italo de Moragas, 2020. "Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability," CSEF Working Papers 557, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:557
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    1. Cagé, Julia, 2020. "Media competition, information provision and political participation: Evidence from French local newspapers and elections, 1944–2014," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    2. Francesco Drago & Tommaso Nannicini & Francesco Sobbrio, 2014. "Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 159-188, July.
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    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/478a1feno18otpdr60lclo4fuq is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2018. "When to Drop a Bombshell," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(4), pages 2139-2172.
    6. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro & Michael Sinkinson, 2011. "The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 2980-3018, December.
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