Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria
Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the rel- ative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered in Roemer (2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations such as the the extension to multicriteria games of the Selten's (1975) trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept.
|Date of creation:||30 Jul 2009|
|Publication status:||published in Journal of Optimization, Theory and Applications, 2010, Vol. 145, 429449|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: I-80126 Napoli|
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- Peter Borm & Freek van Megen & Stef Tijs, 1999.
"A perfectness concept for multicriteria games,"
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research,
Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 49(3), pages 401-412, July.
- van Megen, F. & Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1995. "A perfectness concept for multicriteria games," Discussion Paper 1995-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Borm, P.E.M. & van Megen, F.J.C. & Tijs, S.H., 1999. "A perfectness concept for multicriteria games," Other publications TiSEM 322bd1a7-90e0-400d-b167-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Giuseppe De Marco & Jacqueline Morgan, 2007. "A Refinement Concept For Equilibria In Multicriteria Games Via Stable Scalarizations," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 169-181.
- Roth, Alvin E., 1977. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-251, December.
- Loridan, P. & Morgan, J. & Raucci, R., 1997. "Convergence of Minimal and Approximate Minimal Elements of Sets in Partially Ordered Vector Spaces," Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications 97.94, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Jacqueline Morgan, 2005. "Approximations and Well-Posedness in Multicriteria Games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 257-268, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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