An asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
In 1972, Harsanyi and Selten characterized a one parameter asymmetric Nash solution. In this note I do the analog for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. By dropping symmetry and adding a restrivted version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives to the set of axioms that lead to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, I characterize an asymmetric version of that solution concept that depends only on one parameter.
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- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
- Imai, Haruo, 1983. "Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 389-401, March.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Peters, H.J.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1985. "Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions," Other publications TiSEM 52f5a6d5-dcac-4fec-9b8e-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Thomson, W., 1989.
"Cooperative Models Of Bargaining,"
RCER Working Papers
177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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