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An asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

  • Dubra, Juan

In 1972, Harsanyi and Selten characterized a one parameter asymmetric Nash solution. In this note I do the analog for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. By dropping symmetry and adding a restrivted version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives to the set of axioms that lead to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, I characterize an asymmetric version of that solution concept that depends only on one parameter.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-443JYPF-1/2/5665ed9d0f04f465cadc143f29c8e8cd
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 73 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 131-136

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:73:y:2001:i:2:p:131-136
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Imai, Haruo, 1983. "Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 389-401, March.
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  4. Peters, H.J.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1985. "Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions," Other publications TiSEM 52f5a6d5-dcac-4fec-9b8e-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  6. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
  7. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154267 is not listed on IDEAS
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