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Investment Coordination in Network Industries: The Case of Electricity Grid and Electricity

Author

Listed:
  • Felix H√∂ffler

    (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln)

  • Achim Wambach

    (Department of Economics, University of Cologne)

Abstract

Liberalization of network industries frequently separates the network from the other parts of the industry. This is important in particular for the electricity industry where private firms invest into generation facilities, while net- work investments usually are controlled by regulators. We discuss two regulatory regimes. First, the regulator can only decide on the network extension. Second, she can additionally use a "capacity market" with payments contingent on private generation investment. For the first case, we find that even absent asymmetric information, a lack of regulatory commitment can cause inefficiently high or inefficiently low investments. For the second case, we develop a standard handicap auction which implements the first best under asymmetric information, if there are no shadow costs of public funds. With shadow costs, no simple mechanism can implement the second best outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix H√∂ffler & Achim Wambach, 2013. "Investment Coordination in Network Industries: The Case of Electricity Grid and Electricity," EWI Working Papers 2013-12, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:ewikln:2013_012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Neetzow, Paul & Pechan, Anna & Eisenack, Klaus, 2018. "Electricity storage and transmission: Complements or substitutes?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 367-377.
    3. Chao, Hung-po & Wilson, Robert, 2020. "Coordination of electricity transmission and generation investments," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    4. Ibarra-Yunez, Alejandro, 2015. "Energy reform in Mexico: Imperfect unbundling in the electricity sector," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 19-27.
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    8. Feld, Lars P. & Fuest, Clemens & Haucap, Justus & Schweitzer, Heike & Wieland, Volker & Wigger, Berthold U., 2014. "Neustart in der Energiepolitik jetzt!," Kronberger Kreis-Studien 58, Stiftung Marktwirtschaft / The Market Economy Foundation, Berlin.
    9. Joachim Bertsch & Simeon Hagspiel & Lisa Just, 2016. "Congestion management in power systems," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 290-327, December.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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