The Complex Interaction of Markets For Endangered Species Products
Abstract Economic models of trade in endangered species products often do not incorporate four focal arguments in the policy debate over trade bans: 1) law-abiding consumers may operate in another market, separate from illegal consumers, that trade would bring online; 2) legal trade reduces stigma, which affects demand of law-abiding consumers; 3) laundering may bring illegal goods to legal markets when trade is allowed; 4) legal sales may affect illegal supply costs. This paper analyzes systematically which aspects of these complicated markets, separately or in combination, are important for determining whether limited legalized trade in otherwise illegal goods can be helpful for achieving policy goals like reducing poaching.
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- Heltberg, Rasmus, 2001. "Impact of the ivory trade ban on poaching incentives: a numerical example," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 189-195, February.
- Bergstrom, Ted, 1990. "On the Economics of Crime and Confiscation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 171-78, Summer.
- Bulte, Erwin H. & van Kooten, G. Cornelis, 1996. "A note on ivory trade and elephant conservation," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(04), pages 433-443, October.
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