Optimal Fragile Financial Networks
the structure of the decentralized financial network is equal to the efficient one, yielding an expected payoff arbitrarily close to the efficient one. However, the investment decision is not the same. That is, in the decentralized network some banks will gamble as compared to the socially preferred outcome.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nier, Erlend & Yang, Jing & Yorulmazer, Tanju & Alentorn, Amadeo, 2007.
"Network models and financial stability,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 2033-2060, June.
- Sandro Brusco & Fabio Castiglionesi, 2007.
"Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard, and Financial Contagion,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 62(5), pages 2275-2302, October.
- Sandro Brusco & Fabio Castiglionesi, 2005. "Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard and Financial Contagion," Department of Economics Working Papers 05-12, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed008:658. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.