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Individual Characteristics and Behavior in Repeated Games: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Douglas Davis

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Asen Ivanov

    (Queen Mary University of London)

  • Oleg Korenok

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Abstract

Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games, compliance with first-order stochastic dominance, ability to plan ahead, and gender. We do find some systematic relationships. A subject's patience, gender, altruism, and compliance with first-order stochastic dominance have some limited systematic effects on her behavior in repeated games. At the level of a pair of subjects who are playing a repeated game, each subject's patience, gender, and ability to choose an available dominant strategy in a one-shot matrix game systematically affect the frequency of the cooperate-cooperate outcome. However, overall, the number of systematic relationships is surprisingly small.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas Davis & Asen Ivanov & Oleg Korenok, 2014. "Individual Characteristics and Behavior in Repeated Games: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 728, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    15. repec:tiu:tiucen:200922 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume Frechette & Sevgi Yuksel, 2021. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," ISER Discussion Paper 1119r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    2. Felix Kölle & Simone Quercia & Egon Tripodi, 2023. "Social Preferences under the Shadow of the Future," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 406, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    3. Emel Filiz-Ozbay & John C. Ham & John H. Kagel & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2018. "The role of cognitive ability and personality traits for men and women in gift exchange outcomes," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 650-672, September.
    4. Xu, Xue & Zheng, Kun, 2024. "Private monitoring revisited: When does a shared history matter?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    5. Felix Koelle & Thomas Lauer, 2018. "Cooperation, Discounting, and the Effects of Delayed Costs and Benefits," Discussion Papers 2018-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    6. Felix Kölle & Thomas Lauer, 2024. "Understanding Cooperation in an Intertemporal Context," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(11), pages 7791-7810, November.
    7. Douglas Davis, 2016. "Experimental Methods for the General Economist: Five Lessons from the Lab," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(4), pages 1046-1058, April.
    8. Espín, Antonio M. & Correa, Manuel & Ruiz-Villaverde, Alberto, 2019. "Patience predicts cooperative synergy: The roles of ingroup bias and reciprocity," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    9. Eugenio Proto & Aldo Rustichini & Andis Sofianos, 2019. "Intelligence, Personality, and Gains from Cooperation in Repeated Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(3), pages 1351-1390.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experiment; Repeated game; Individual characteristics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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