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Individual Characteristics and Behavior in Repeated Games: An Experimental Study

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Listed:
  • Douglas Davis

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Asen Ivanov

    (Queen Mary University of London)

  • Oleg Korenok

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Abstract

Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games, compliance with first-order stochastic dominance, ability to plan ahead, and gender. We do find some systematic relationships. A subject's patience, gender, altruism, and compliance with first-order stochastic dominance have some limited systematic effects on her behavior in repeated games. At the level of a pair of subjects who are playing a repeated game, each subject's patience, gender, and ability to choose an available dominant strategy in a one-shot matrix game systematically affect the frequency of the cooperate-cooperate outcome. However, overall, the number of systematic relationships is surprisingly small.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas Davis & Asen Ivanov & Oleg Korenok, 2014. "Individual Characteristics and Behavior in Repeated Games: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 728, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:728
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    Cited by:

    1. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume Frechette & Sevgi Yuksel, 2021. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," ISER Discussion Paper 1119rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised May 2022.
    2. Felix Kölle & Simone Quercia & Egon Tripodi, 2023. "Social Preferences under the Shadow of the Future," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 406, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    3. Douglas Davis, 2016. "Experimental Methods for the General Economist: Five Lessons from the Lab," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(4), pages 1046-1058, April.
    4. Emel Filiz-Ozbay & John C. Ham & John H. Kagel & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2018. "The role of cognitive ability and personality traits for men and women in gift exchange outcomes," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 650-672, September.
    5. Felix Koelle & Thomas Lauer, 2018. "Cooperation, Discounting, and the Effects of Delayed Costs and Benefits," Discussion Papers 2018-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    6. Felix Kölle & Thomas Lauer, 2020. "Understanding Cooperation in an Intertemporal Context," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 046, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    7. Espín, Antonio M. & Correa, Manuel & Ruiz-Villaverde, Alberto, 2019. "Patience predicts cooperative synergy: The roles of ingroup bias and reciprocity," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    8. Eugenio Proto & Aldo Rustichini & Andis Sofianos, 2019. "Intelligence, Personality, and Gains from Cooperation in Repeated Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(3), pages 1351-1390.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experiment; Repeated game; Individual characteristics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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