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Evaluating Minimum-Traffic Guarantees for PPPs in Turkey by Real-Option Pricing


  • Ilker Ersegun Kayhan

    () (Chevening/Abdullah Gül Research Fellow, Oxford Center for Islamic Studies, University of Oxford)

  • Glenn P. Jenkins

    () (Queen’s University, Canada and Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus)


Minimum-traffic guarantees for build-operate-transfer toll-road projects are contingent liabilities that expose government to fiscal risk. Therefore, public authorities must value guarantees, thereby enabling informed decision-making about the level and type of guarantee provision. This study demonstrates the use of financial modeling and risk analysis in a toll-road project in Turkey, contributing to the narrowing of a capacity gap in the field. We present three types of guarantee, modeled as real options and evaluated by Monte Carlo simulation. We identify one criterion to determine the optimum level of guarantee for a given project, and one criterion to measure the extent to which a guarantee will reduce risk. Based on these and other complementary criteria, it is proposed that the guarantee with income ceiling is the most appropriate for the project considered here. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Ilker Ersegun Kayhan & Glenn P. Jenkins, 2016. "Evaluating Minimum-Traffic Guarantees for PPPs in Turkey by Real-Option Pricing," Development Discussion Papers 2016-02, JDI Executive Programs.
  • Handle: RePEc:qed:dpaper:284

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Robert C. Merton, 2005. "Theory of rational option pricing," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Theory Of Valuation, chapter 8, pages 229-288 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Jun Jaebum, 2010. "Appraisal of Combined Agreements in BOT Project Finance: Focused on Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Revenue Cap Agreements," International Journal of Strategic Property Management, Sciendo, vol. 14(2), pages 139-155, June.
    3. Robert Bain, 2009. "Error and optimism bias in toll road traffic forecasts," Transportation, Springer, vol. 36(5), pages 469-482, September.
    4. Timothy Irwin, 2003. "Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15117, November.
    5. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    6. Currie, Elizabeth, 2002. "The potential role of government debt management office in monitoring and managing contingent liabilities," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34871, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    7. Charles Cheah & Jicai Liu, 2006. "Valuing governmental support in infrastructure projects as real options using Monte Carlo simulation," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(5), pages 545-554.
    8. Carliss Baldwin & Donald Lessard & Scott Mason, 1983. "Budgetary Time Bombs: Controlling Government Loan Guarantees," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 9(3), pages 338-346, September.
    9. Anand Rajaram & Tuan Minh Le & Kai Kaiser & Jay-Hyung Kim & Jonas Frank, 2014. "The Power of Public Investment Management : Transforming Resources into Assets for Growth," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 20393, November.
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    More about this item


    Contingent liabilities; government guarantees; real options; cost-benefit analysis; public-private partnerships; infrastructure; Turkey.;

    JEL classification:

    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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