What Happens After Default? Stylized Facts on Access to Credit
In this paper we investigate what happens to firms after they default on their bank loans. We approach this question by establishing a set of stylized facts concerning the evolution of default and its resolution, focusing on access to credit after default. Using a unique dataset from Portugal, we observe that half of the default episodes last 5 quarters or less and that larger firms have shorter default periods. Most firms continue to have access to credit immediately after default, though only a minority has access to new loans. Firms have more difficulties in regaining access to credit if they are small, if their default was long and severe, if they borrow from only one bank or if they default with their main lender. Further, half of the defaulting firms record another default in the future. We observe that firms with repeated defaults are, on average, smaller and have experienced longer and more severe defaults.
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