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Bounds on the Welfare Loss of Moral Hazard with Limited Liability

Listed author(s):
  • Felipe Balmaceda

    ()

    (Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales)

  • Santiago Balseiro

    ()

    (The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)

  • Jose Correa

    ()

    (Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial, Universidad de Chile)

  • Nicolas Stier-Moses

    ()

    (Columbia School of Business, Columbia University)

This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort level spaces. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. We consider the ratio between the first-best social welfare to the social welfare arising from the principal’s optimal pay-for-performance contract, i.e., the welfare loss. In the presence of moral hazard, we provide simple parametric bounds on the welfare loss of a given instance, and then study the worst-case welfare loss among all instances with a fixed number of effort and outcome levels. Key parameters to these bounds are the number of possible effort levels, the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome, and the ratio between costs of the highest and the lowest effort levels. As extensions, we also look at linear contracts and at cases with multiple identical tasks. Our work constitutes an initial effort to analyze losses arising from moral hazard problems when the agent is subject to limited liability, and shows that these losses can be costly in the worst case.

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File URL: http://www.udp.cl/descargas/facultades_carreras/economia/pdf/documentos_investigacion/wp_55_Balmaceda_Bounds_Welfare_Loss_Moral_Hazard.pdf
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Paper provided by Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales in its series Working Papers with number 55.

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Date of creation: Sep 2014
Handle: RePEc:ptl:wpaper:55
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.udp.cl

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  1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
  2. Acemoglu, Daron & Bimpikis, Kostas & Ozdaglar, Asuman, 2009. "Price and capacity competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-26, May.
  3. repec:sae:ilrrev:v:43:y:1990:i:3:p:89-106 is not listed on IDEAS
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