Defaults en carteras hipotecarias, macroeconomía y arreglos institucionales: Más allá de los modelos de Credit-Scoring tradicionales
[Mortgage defaults, macroeconomics, and institutional arrangements: Beyond the standard Credit Scoring]
This paper explores determinants of mortgage default, enlightening the transmission mechanisms between the economic cycle, institutional arrangements and the microeconomic event of individual default. It revises the scope and limitations of standard credit-scoring models, that is those generic classification models used by banks to discriminate good from bad debtors. Starting from a microeconomic model of mortgage default, it is shown that there will be some level of strategic defaults, even in a hypothetical world in which standard Credit-Scoring models work perfectly. That means a specification error in standard models, which only capture the solvency-tied fundamentals of repayment, but no the strategic ones triggered by macroeconomic and institutional factors. Some alternative methods and policy measures are suggested.
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- Mark Schreiner, 2001. "A Scoring Model of the Risk of Costly Arrears at a Microfinance Lender in Bolivia," Development and Comp Systems 0109005, EconWPA.
- Padilla, A. Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000.
"Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1951-1980, December.
- A Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1994. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0043, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
- Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1999. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers 9911, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1999. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," CSEF Working Papers 21, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1996. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers 73, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1996. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers 0073, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Mark Schreiner, 2001. "Credit Scoring for Microfinance: Can It Work?," Development and Comp Systems 0108003, EconWPA, revised 27 Dec 2001.
- Herrera, Santiago & Perry, Guillermo, 2001. "Tropical bubbles : asset prices in Latin America, 1980-2001," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2724, The World Bank. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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