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The Unbalanced Physical Movements of International Trade

  • Liu, Haiyang

The goods produced in developed nations are often of higher quality, advanced technology and better design, hence goods even with little physical mass have higher value than goods produced in developing nations. This means that if the payment is balanced between developed and developing nations, the physical mass must be unbalanced. As a result, developed nations will become increasingly heavier, and the northern hemisphere where developed nations are clustered will also become more and more heavy. The earth will be reshaped like a ice-cream. Using customs data we confirm this conjecture.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 54163.

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Date of creation: 02 Jan 2014
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:54163
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  1. McMillan, John & Naughton, Barry, 1992. "How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 130-43, Spring.
  2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  3. Abhinay Muthoo, . "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Economics Discussion Papers 420, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  4. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
  5. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-37, May.
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