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Death Spiral Issues in Emerging Market: A Control Related Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Kim, Woochan
  • Kim, Woojin
  • Kim, Hyung-Seok

Abstract

This paper studies the motive of issuing floating-priced convertibles or warrants, known as death spirals, in a country where the private benefit of control is high. Using a total of 199 death spiral issuances by public firms listed in the Korea Stock Exchange during 1998-2006, we find a number of pieces of empirical evidence that are less consistent with the conventional last resort financing hypothesis, but rather consistent with the control enhancing or control transferring hypothesis. First, abnormal returns subsequent to death spiral issuance is negative, but more so in poorly governed firms. Second, operating performance of chaebol issuers are not necessarily low at the time of the issue nor does it deteriorate over time, but they still prefer to issue death spirals over traditional fixed-priced hybrid securities. Third, we do not observe subsequent changes in the controlling shareholder in more than 60% of the issuers and these firms exhibit superior operating performance at the time of the issue compared to other death spiral or non-death spiral issuers. Fourth, this same set of firms do not experience a decrease in proportional ownership by the controlling party, while family members other than the controlling shareholder experience the most pronounced increases in the number of shares held. Finally, in approximately half of these firms, at least one member of the controlling party holds hybrid securities that can later be converted into voting shares.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Woochan & Kim, Woojin & Kim, Hyung-Seok, 2012. "Death Spiral Issues in Emerging Market: A Control Related Perspective," MPRA Paper 44031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:44031
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    4. Brown, Stephen J. & Warner, Jerold B., 1985. "Using daily stock returns : The case of event studies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-31, March.
    5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    6. repec:hrv:faseco:30747165 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Hillion, Pierre & Vermaelen, Theo, 2004. "Death spiral convertibles," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 381-415, February.
    9. David J. Brophy & Paige P. Ouimet & Clemens Sialm, 2009. "Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(2), pages 541-574, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Death spirals; Convertibles; Warrants; Control enhancing mechanisms; Korea;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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