Strategic commitment to pursue a goal other than profit in a Cournot duopoly
Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives for firms to commit to maximize a performance metric other than profit. We briefly review the underlying theory, analyze its ramifications in a Cournot duopoly, and consider feasibility constraints from the perspective of strategic management.
|Date of creation:||01 Jul 2012|
|Publication status:||Published in Gakushuin Economic Papers 2.49(2012): pp. 133-142|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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