La influencia de las instituciones en la racionalidad del individuo a partir de Adam Smith
[The influence of institutions on individuals rationality from Adam Smith]
The Neoclassical Theory assumes that individuals are essentially selfish and maximize the utility of their income, measured on some utility scale. It defines the rationality of individuals based on preference relations, which should not change by the context. However, it is a fact that individuals do not generally use these “market rules” with their families, friends, colleagues or in their neighborhoods. This behavior has been seen as “Bounded rationality” or “failures” in the individual’s behavior. The main objective of this paper is to explore this kind of behavior and pose some questions about how institutions influence the preferences and decisions of individuals in some contexts. The assumption we have is: In reality, the homo economicus considers context as additional information and reacts on that basis. He adapts to the community with which he interacts as a matter of “survival”. We conclude that there is a “Broader rationality” in that behavior, which goes beyond the one defined in the Neoclassical Theory, which is applicable in highly specific conditions.
|Date of creation:||05 Oct 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rabin, Matthew, 1997.
"Psychology and Economics,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt8jd5z5j2, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
- Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
- Sen, Amartya, 1994. "The Formulation of Rational Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 385-90, May.
- Joseph Henrich & Robert Boyd & Samuel Bowles & Colin Camerer & Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis & Richard McElreath, 2001. "Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-scale Societies," Working Papers 01-01-007, Santa Fe Institute.
- Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.