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Il federalismo fiscale e la questione della corretta distribuzione territoriale del gettito IVA
[The Implementation of Fiscal Federalism in Italy: the Appropriate Spatial Distribution of the VAT Revenue]

Author

Listed:
  • Villani, Salvatore

Abstract

Recent attempts of "regionalizing" the VAT, in order to expand fiscal autonomy margins attributed to Regions and to involve them in the hard struggle against tax evasion, strongly urge some considerations on some of the changes introduced in the Italian legal system by the 2001 constitutional reform. Particularly, two issues deserve to be investigated, so far systematically neglected, if not absolutely ignored: the first concerning the regulation of revenue taxes sharing mechanism, the second, which is included in the first issue, regarding how choosing some even criteria of territorial distribution of tax revenue. In particular, this paper focuses on this second issue, joining the recent debate about the enforcement of the art. 119 of the Constitution (fiscal federalism) with a critical analysis of the "sales splitting up method", suggested in order to best realize VAT's decentralization and to make the local civil service aware of its responsibilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Villani, Salvatore, 2007. "Il federalismo fiscale e la questione della corretta distribuzione territoriale del gettito IVA
    [The Implementation of Fiscal Federalism in Italy: the Appropriate Spatial Distribution of the VAT Re
    ," MPRA Paper 30024, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30024
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30024/1/MPRA_paper_30024.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-1023, October.
    2. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
    3. Axel Dreher & Christos Kotsogiannis & Steve McCorriston, 2009. "How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(6), pages 773-796, December.
    4. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich, 2009. "The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on the shadow economy," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 228-245, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Value Added Tax; Tax Evasion; Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations; Differentials among Jurisdictions; Fiscal Federalism;

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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