Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché
[Polluting nonrenewable resources: decentralization of the optimum in the presence of market power]
In this paper, I study the strategic interactions between a country that owns a monopoly on a polluting non renewable resource (basically, the OPEC), and a representative of countries that both consume the resource and are hurt by its pollution. Both pollution control and rent captation are at stake in this model.
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"Environmental Taxes on Exhaustible Resources,"
Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen
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