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Monetary and nonmonetary incentive measures: which work better in the Czech betting firm?

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  • Martin, Pardupa

Abstract

In this paper I examine the interrelation between monetary and non monetary incentive measures and the performance of a betting firm in the Czech Republic. Previous studies have focused either solely on monetary measures in order to examine the positive and adverse monetary incentive effects or on measuring the effect of certain non monetary managerial objectives and often on the level of top managers. I argue that the monetary and non monetary incentive measures should be analyzed separately as they influence the final outcome in a methodologically different way and that the analysis on lower level of organization can bring more reliable data. The evidence from unique set of medium term data from the Czech betting firm shows the possible positive effect of increased wage variability on its performance while the effect of trainings and nonmonetary rewards were proven as insignificant.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin, Pardupa, 2010. "Monetary and nonmonetary incentive measures: which work better in the Czech betting firm?," MPRA Paper 25933, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25933
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25933/1/MPRA_paper_25933.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Carpenter Jeffrey P & Seki Erika, 2005. "Competitive Work Environments and Social Preferences: Field Experimental Evidence from a Japanese Fishing Community," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-25, December.
    3. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary incentives; trainings; knowledge dispersion; wage dispersion;

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    • M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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