Property Rights and Theory of Value
This paper analyses and develops a conception of property rights and in turn makes possible the development of a new approach to the theory of value. As a result, the theory of value takes a more general form and the labor theory of value becomes one of special cases applicable to a primitive society only. Generally all three factors of production, namely the labor force, land, and capital, can create value, but only if there are property rights to them. This necessary condition has led us logically to a principle of relativity for property rights and, accordingly, value. Moreover, it is concluded that although capitalist economics considers practically everything as a commodity, there is, however, an exception – the labor force, which is only one that cannot be sold or bought.
|Date of creation:||03 Sep 2006|
|Date of revision:||31 Jul 2009|
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