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Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle

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  • Wu, Haoyang

Abstract

In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for decades. Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the revelation principle. However, in this paper, we argue that there are serious bugs hidden in their proofs.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Haoyang, 2010. "Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle," MPRA Paper 24516, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24516
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Revelation principle; Mechanism design; Implementation theory.;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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