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The Euro-Project at Risk

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  • Hauskrecht, Andreas
  • Stuart, Bryan
  • Hankel, Wilhelm

Abstract

In contrast to Robert Mundell‘s Optimum Currency Area theory and his recommendation of forming a monetary union, the economic fundamentals of Euro area member countries have not harmonized. The opposite holds: the Euro core countries - most of all Germany, but also the Netherlands and Finland - increased productivity growth while limiting nominal wage growth. However, Mediterranean countries - particularly Greece, but also Spain, Portugal, and Italy - have dramatically lost international competitiveness. Although the overall balance of payments for the Euro area at large is almost balanced, internal disequilibria are skyrocketing and default risk premiums and tensions within the Euro area are rising, thus jeopardizing the stability of the monetary union. The findings confirm that a common currency without fiscal union is inherently unstable. The international financial and economic crisis has merely triggered events which highlight this instability. The paper discusses three possible scenarios for the future of the Euro: a laissez faire approach, a bailout, and finally an exit strategy for the Mediterranean countries, or an organized exit by a group of core countries led by Germany, forming their own smaller monetary union.

Suggested Citation

  • Hauskrecht, Andreas & Stuart, Bryan & Hankel, Wilhelm, 2010. "The Euro-Project at Risk," MPRA Paper 23750, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23750
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 1247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    5. Michele Fratianni & Andreas Hauskrecht, 1998. "From the Gold Standard to a Bipolar Monetary System," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 609-636, January.
    6. von Hagen, Jurgen & Schmitz, Birgit, 2009. "Current Account Imbalances and Financial Integration in the Euro Area," CEPR Discussion Papers 7262, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Jeffrey Frankel & Andrew Rose, 2002. "An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and Income," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(2), pages 437-466.
    8. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 199-210, March.
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    1. repec:cnb:ocpubv:as12 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Eszter Boros, 2017. "Endogenous Imbalances in a Single Currency Area," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 16(2), pages 86-118.
    3. Michele Fratianni, 2012. "The Future International Monetary System: Dominant Currencies or Supranational Money? An Introduction," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-12, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimum currency areas; monetary union; risk spreads; central banking; exchange rates; fiscal policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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