Robust Control and Monetary Policy Delegation
This paper adapts in a simple static context the Rogoff's (1985) analysis of monetary policy delegation to a conservative central banker to the robust control framework. In this framework, uncertainty means that policymakers are unsure about their model, in the sense that there is a group of approximate models that they also consider as possibly true, and their objective is to choose a rule that will work under a range of di¤erent model specifications. We find that robustness reveals the emergence of a precautionary behaviour in the case of unstructured model uncertainty, reducing thus government's willingness to delegate monetary policy to a conservative central banker.
|Date of creation:||21 Jul 2006|
|Publication status:||Published in Massimo Salzano and David Colander (ed.): “Complexity Hints for Economic Policy”, Springer-Verlag Publisher, 2007 (2007): pp. 303-310|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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