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Демократизация И Экономический Рост
[Democratization and Economic Growth]

Author

Listed:
  • Polterovich, Victor
  • Popov, Vladimir

Abstract

There are two innovations in the paper as compared to the previous literature on democracy and growth. First, we consider not only the level of democracy, but also changes in this level in the 1970s-1990s as measured by increments of Freedom House political rights indices. Second, the distinction is made between democracy and law and order (order based on legal rules); the latter is measured by the rule of law, investors' risk and corruption indices. We discuss two interconnected threshold hypotheses: (1) in countries where law and order is strong enough, democratization stimulates economic growth, whereas in countries with poor law and order democratization undermines growth; (2) if democratization occurs under the conditions of poor law and order (so that illiberal democracy emerges), then shadow economy expands, quality of governance worsens, and macroeconomic policy becomes less prudent. We adduce a number of stylized facts to support our hypotheses. However our econometric findings are mixed: we report results that support the hypotheses as well as regressions that contradict them.

Suggested Citation

  • Polterovich, Victor & Popov, Vladimir, 2007. "Демократизация И Экономический Рост [Democratization and Economic Growth]," MPRA Paper 23012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Теория Опекаемых Благ И Патернализм В Экономических Теориях: Общее И Особенное [The Theory of Patronized Goods and the Paternalism in Economic Theories: General and Special]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2015:1, Institute of Economics.
    3. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Методологический Анализ Теории Опекаемых Благ: Научный Доклад [methodological analysis of the Theory of Patronized Goods. Research report]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2014:1, Institute of Economics.
    4. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Введение В Общую Теорию Изъянов Смешанной Экономики [Introduction to the general theory of defects of the mixed economy]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2016:3, Institute of Economics.
    5. Polterovich (Полтерович), Victor (Виктор), 2012. "Приватизация И Рациональная Структура Собственности. Часть 1. Приватизация: Проблема Эффективности [Privatization and the rational ownership structure. Part 1: privatization: the effeciency problem," MPRA Paper 64145, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич & Городецкий Андрей Евгеньевич, "undated". "Некоторые Аспекты Экономической Теории Государства. Научный Доклад [Some aspects of the economic theory of the state. Scientific report]," Working papers a:pru175:a:pgo471:ye:2017, Institute of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic growth; democracy; rule of law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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