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Теория Опекаемых Благ И Патернализм В Экономических Теориях: Общее И Особенное
[The Theory of Patronized Goods and the Paternalism in Economic Theories: General and Special]


  • Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич


Работа посвящена сравнительному методологическому анализу теории общественных и мериторных товаров, концепции либертарианского патернализма и теории опекаемых благ. В ней обсуждаются некоторые модификации двух принципов – методологического субъективизма и методологического индивидуализма, составляющих основу ряда теорий, обосновывающих государственную активность. Выполненный анализ основных предпосылок позволил автору предположить, что, с точки зрения методологии эти теоретические построения являются частными случаями теории опекаемых благ, фундамент которой составляют «методологический субъективизм», «методологический релятивизм», обусловливающие природу нормативных интересов. Рассматриваются институциональные и политологические аспекты формирования этих интересов общества «sui generis», в основе которых лежат «коллективные решения», и сформулирован общий принцип политической конкуренции в виде еще одной предпосылки – необходимость создания институтов, ограничивающих «диктатуру» парламентского большинства. В последней главе представлены примеры конкретных институтов такого рода. The work is devoted to a comparative methodological analysis of the Theory of Public and Meritory Goods, to the Concept of Libertarian Paternalism and to the Theory of Patronized Goods. It discusses some modifications of the two principles, which are as follows: the methodological subjectivism and the methodological individualism, that constitute the basis of a number of theories, substantiating the state activity. The executed analysis of the main prerequisites allowed the author to assume that, in terms of methodology, these theoretical constructs are the special cases of the Theory of Patronized Goods, which make up the foundation of «the methodological subjectivism», "the methodological relativism", stipulating the nature of regulatory interests. The final part of the study discusses the institutional and political science aspects of the formation of these public interests called «sui generis», which are based on «the collective decisions», and the general principle of political competition is formulated in the form of yet another premise – that is about the need to establish the institutions that limit the «the dictatorship» of the parliamentary majority . The annex to the main text provides the examples of specific institutions of this kind.

Suggested Citation

  • Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Теория Опекаемых Благ И Патернализм В Экономических Теориях: Общее И Особенное
    [The Theory of Patronized Goods and the Paternalism in Economic Theories: General and Special]
    ," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2015:1, Institute of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:rua:wpaper:a:pru175:ye:2015:1

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    References listed on IDEAS

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      [methodological analysis of the Theory of Patronized Goods. Research report]
      ," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2014:1, Institute of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Экономический Кризис И Новая Парадигма Общественной Поддержки Опекаемых Благ
      [Economic Crisis and the New Paradigm of Public Support of the Patronized Goods]
      ," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2015:2, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item


    patronized goods; public goods; meritorics; libertarian paternalism; methodological subjectivism; methodological individualism. methodological relativism; regulatory interests; political competition; institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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