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Unemployment and Clientelism: The Piqueteros of Argentina

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  • Ponce, Aldo Fernando

Abstract

This paper sheds light on possible explanations for the success and sustainability of the piqueteros social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative perspective based on Latin America. I show which institutional arrangements, political actors, and configurations of power contributed to the success of the piqueteros. Applying the basic principles of the rational choice approach, I find that the success of the piqueteros movement was produced by the current political division in the ruling party (the Peronist party), by the over-regulated Argentine labor market, and by the impact of the Argentine economic crisis through the unemployment rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Ponce, Aldo Fernando, 2006. "Unemployment and Clientelism: The Piqueteros of Argentina," MPRA Paper 23, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
    2. Guillermo Mondino & Silvia Montoya, 2000. "The Effects of Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms: Empirical Evidence for Argentina," Research Department Publications 3091, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    3. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 85-104, March.
    4. Guillermo Mondino & Silvia Montoya, 2000. "The Effects of Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms: Empirical Evidence for Argentina," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 43040, Inter-American Development Bank.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment; social movements; federalism; institutions; unions; Argentina;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General

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